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Fiji’s December 2006 military coup and the 
abrogation of the country’s Constitution 
in April 2009 have generated conflicting 
reactions. Australia, New Zealand, the 
European Union, the Commonwealth 
and the Pacific Islands Forum have 
condemned the actions of coup leader, 
Frank Bainimarama, who currently serves 
as interim prime minister. They have 
sought Bainimarama’s agreement to fresh 
elections and to restarting the ‘President’s 
Forum’ dialogue with elected politicians, 
which he abandoned in April. A significant 
minority of the civil society movement 
within Fiji has, however, backed the post-
coup government’s reformist agenda, even 
in some cases to the point of accepting that 
it must be enacted through authoritarian 
means.
Overseas, Bainimarama’s government 
also has outspoken sympathisers who tend 
to be still more enthusiastic about the re-
gime’s objectives and less critical of military 
repression than the coup leader’s fellow 
travellers in Fiji. Within the country, those 
with opposing views have been silenced, 
particularly since the media clampdown of 
April 2009. As a result, Fiji’s government 
has been able to complain loudly, without 
provoking a storm of protest in the local 
press, that criticisms of its actions are based 
on ignorance of Fiji’s history and a lack of 
awareness of the unique difficulties that the 
country has faced since independence. That 
claim is deeply misleading.
Those who attempt to justify Fiji’s 
December 2006 coup argue that the mili-
tary’s action was necessary to move the 
country’s political arena away from control 
by ethnically based politicians and parties. 
According to the Vanuatu-based Pacific 
Institute of Public Policy, for example, the 
coup provided a ‘circuit breaker’ that could 
rid Fiji of corruption and racism, reform 
a ‘gerrymandered electoral system’ and 
‘embrace one-person one-vote’ (Pacific 
Institute of Public Policy 2009). Even the 
abrogation of Fiji’s Constitution in April 
has not stilled the sympathy of those who 
believe Bainimarama’s coup constitutes a 
‘revolution for clean-up’, as the Fiji Labour 
Party’s Lekh Ram Vayeshnoi called it in 
June 2007 (FijiLive, 25 June 2007; Fiji Daily 
Post, 22 June 2007). (His leader, Mahendra 
Chaudhry, is now furiously backtracking on 
such claims, following his party’s departure 
from Bainimarama’s government.) The claim 
that the coup is ‘revolutionary’ is, after all, 
the only plausible rejoinder to those who 
argue for the sanctity of the rule of law and 
the inviolability of democracy. Father Kevin 
Barr, one of several Catholic leftists who have 
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taken up positions in the new order, argued 
in December 2006 that Bainimarama’s coup 
should be seen in the context of those many 
cases in the history of nations in which 
‘kings were deposed, wars were fought, 
governments were ousted or revolutions 
were begun in order to bring about a more 
just regime change’ (Baleinakorodawa, Barr 
and Qalowasa 2006).
In accord with this type of insurrectionist 
interpretation, Bainimarama has cast him-
self in the role of a modern-day Robespierre 
seeking to transcend the parochial divisions 
of the ancien regime or as a reborn Kamal 
Attaturk intent on building a modern 
secular order. It would be hard to deny that 
the early history of nation building has often 
involved crushing communalist challenges 
to the emergence of the modern state, often 
as the domestic by-product of external wars. 
International opinion has, however, swung 
against suppressing communalist ideology 
as a route to robust state formation—partly, 
perhaps, because the world wars of the mid-
twentieth century discredited nationalist 
ideology. No-one seriously imagines that it 
is possible to resolve the difficulties in Iraq 
or Afghanistan by concerted attacks on the 
Sunni Muslims in Iraq or the Pashtuns in 
Afghanistan. The recent crushing of Tamil 
separatists by Sri Lanka’s army might 
have been a resounding military victory, 
but it hardly constitutes a durable political 
settlement. It is inconceivable that an assault 
on the institutions of indigenous Fijian 
post-colonial rule might yield a viable future 
for that country.
Fiji’s military clampdown was not 
accompanied by mass killing; but would 
those who sympathise with Bainimarama’s 
suppression of ethno-nationalism have op-
posed this had it been? When Bainimarama 
(through spokesman Neumi Leweni) 
repudiated any negotiated settlement 
in the aftermath of the abrogation of the 
Constitution, rejecting Commonwealth/UN 
efforts to assist in brokering a President’s 
Forum, he was effectively throwing down 
the gauntlet to opponents. When the 
soldiers and police convicted of the murders 
of three indigenous Fijians—Sakuisa 
Rabaka, Nimilote Verebasaga and Tevita 
Malasebe—were released from prison in 
April, the transparent objective was to send 
a message to the military rank and file that 
if they shed blood to protect the regime they 
would be protected from legal action. No 
violent reaction to Bainimarama’s regime 
has resulted as yet. The rather desperate 
hope of coup opponents for a Methodist-
inspired uprising in August 2009 failed to 
materialise (and this was in itself indicative 
of a striking failure of the political opposi-
tion). Were it to do so, however, how far 
would the sympathisers of the suppression 
of ethno-nationalism be prepared to go? 
Does the coup regime survive only because 
of the good graces of its opponents and the 
absence of the kinds of popular resistance 
seen recently in Thailand, Honduras, Iran 
or, a few years back, Pakistan?
Surveying the international experience 
of coups aimed at bridging ethnic divisions, 
it is striking how few cases give credence 
to that objective. West African military 
coups after independence were frequently 
depicted as efforts to counter tribalism or 
tackle civilian corruption, but they almost 
invariably proved to be instruments for the 
triumph of militarised ethnocracy. Coups 
aimed at countering ethnic polarisation 
tend to morph quickly into vehicles for the 
ascendancy of one or the other group.
Bainimarama’s coup started out amid 
grandiose claims of multi-racialist objec-
tives, but has tended to morph into a 
takeover that bears greater resemblance 
to previous ethno-nationalist seizures of 
power. Old hands from Sitivena Rabuka’s 
post-1987 coup governments, such as 
Foreign Minister (and veteran Taukei 
movement supporter), Inoke Kubuabola, 
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Chinese Ambassador, Jim Ah Koy, and 
Education Minister, Filipe Bole, have been 
restored to important positions. Contrary 
to Bainimarama’s claims at the UN General 
Assembly meeting to be waging a battle 
of ‘new élites’ against ‘old élites’, ageing 
figures in the Fijian establishment associated 
with Fiji’s first post-independence Prime 
Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara—such 
as Ratu Epeli Nailatikau and Ratu Epeli 
Ganilau—now occupy pivotal positions 
in the new order. The early enthusiasm of 
some in the Fiji Indian political élite for 
Bainimarama’s coup has faded, with the 
departure of Mahendra Chaudhry’s Fiji 
Labour Party from government in August 
2008. The multiculturalist objectives of the 
coup are still loudly proclaimed at meetings 
of the United Nations or before gatherings of 
ethnic Fijian soldiers at the Queen Elizabeth 
Barracks, but these now sit awkwardly 
alongside events at home. 
The exigencies faced by regimes created 
by coups—unable to rule by consensus—
generally put paid to anti-corruption objec-
tives even faster than the patronage networks 
cultivated by civilian regimes. Where 
military forces acquire some legitimacy in 
the nation-building process or play some 
enduring role in guarding secular state 
traditions (as in Turkey or Indonesia), they 
generally earn this through prestige acquired 
during the struggle for independence or in 
conflicts with external adversaries. More 
usually, ‘coups to end all coups’ that aim to 
transcend communal divisions have ended 
in forms of dictatorship. This was the case 
in Syria, for example, where, after 18 coup 
attempts, the Ba’ath Party in the 1960s seized 
office, pressing a pan-Arabist and socialist 
ideology; but by the 1970s, with Hafez al-
Assad in control, the party moved to cement 
the position of an Alawi-dominated ruling 
élite against popular Sunni opposition.
Fiji’s experience of coups—no-one killed 
in 1987, 16 killed in 2000 and four so far 
since 2006—gives some encouragement to 
theories of Pacific exceptionalism and non-
violence. Many of the early African, Thai 
and Latin American coups, however, were 
much less violent than those that followed. 
With time, there is logic to repeated coups 
becoming ever more questions of life and 
death, with perpetrators becoming bound 
to ‘make or break’ suppression of dissent. 
Bainimarama, if he fails, is unlikely to spend 
his future basking on a tropical island, as 
did his predecessor, George Speight, leader 
of the 2000 coup.
In other words, the idea of an army that 
stands above the fray, insulated from ethnic 
politics, finds little historical support. That 
is especially the case when the military itself 
reflects communal divisions—as it does in 
Fiji, where the military remains 99 per cent 
indigenous and negligible effort has been 
made towards broadening its make-up. 
(The names of new recruits published in 
the local press attest to the continuing 
ethnic imbalance.) Elsewhere, purportedly 
neutral armies have quickly come down 
on one or other side in protracted conflicts. 
In Northern Ireland, the largely Catholic 
and Republican civil rights movement was 
suppressed by the Protestant-dominated 
Royal Ulster Constabulary in the 1960s. 
British troops arriving to keep the peace 
in 1969 were notoriously greeted with 
cups of tea provided by the beleaguered 
Catholic communities of Derry and West 
Belfast. Within days, Britain’s claim to be 
performing a peacekeeping role had been 
repudiated by Republicans. Bloody Sunday, 
internment without trial and the hunger 
strikes followed.
After two decades of civil strife, the 
eventually agreed peace process in Northern 
Ireland provides some inspiration for the par-
ties to other seemingly intractable conflicts. 
The 1998 Good Friday agreement—despite 
considerable teething difficulties—brought 
Republican and Loyalist politicians together 
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in a power-sharing arrangement. It was an 
outcome that accords with what the world 
now knows about how to handle politicised 
ethnicity: that the forcible suppression of 
broadly backed communalist ideology, 
however distasteful that ideology is, rarely 
works. Power sharing—as experimented 
with for the first time since independence 
in Fiji during May–December 2006—brings 
better results, even if lasting transformation 
of the political order requires a great deal of 
hard work and effective leadership. 
Underpinning theories about the 
military transformation of Fijian politics 
often lies a naive instrumentalist theory of 
politicised ethnicity. In its crudest version, 
the prevalence of communal voting in Fiji is 
blamed on the British legacy of racially based 
electorates, which survived in the 1970, 1990 
and 1997 Constitutions. Racially based vot-
ing, however, which is common to both the 
57 per cent ethnic Fijian and 37 per cent Fiji 
Indian populations, does not occur simply 
in the communal constituencies, but also in 
the open contests in which all Fiji’s eligible 
citizens may participate. Societies such as 
Guyana, Bosnia and Northern Ireland also 
exhibit strong communal voting patterns; 
but none of these has Fiji-style, race-based 
electoral rolls. Some attribute this situation 
to the strength of primordial sentiments, as 
if cultural affinities are always impervious 
to political change. Constructivist theories, 
in contrast, reject both instrumentalist 
interpretations of ethnicity as some kind 
of ‘false consciousness’ engineered by 
unscrupulous élites and the primordialist or 
culturalist theories of innate and inevitable 
difference. Ethnic identification is not the 
only possible type of political outlook in 
societies such as Fiji’s, but it can—and in 
that context did—become a powerful and 
enduring source of political identification. 
For that reason, efforts simply to annihilate 
the political representatives of powerful 
social forces are unlikely to be successful, 
and are likely to generate worse problems 
than they are aimed at resolving. The better 
approach, as indicated by the Northern 
Ireland and South African settlements, 
is to try to accommodate distinct groups 
in a social compact, and to depoliticise 
ethnicity.
Perhaps all the lessons of history and 
global politics will leave exceptionalists and 
cultural relativists unconvinced. Perhaps 
Fiji will buck the global trend and, with 
time, communalist ideologies will fade 
and electoral loyalties change. Speaking on 
SBS Television’s Dateline program in July 
2009, Bainimarama acknowledged that his 
hostility to elections was driven by the fact 
that any poll would lead to the re-election of 
the very government he deposed. If, as this 
suggests, the regime lacks the ability to rule 
by consensus then to survive it at least needs 
to consolidate a dependable command 
structure through the state bureaucracy. Yet 
since the social base of the regime remains 
weak, its systems of authority will inevita-
bly remain fragile. The post-coup purges 
of those identified with the old order have 
now given way to purges of those who 
staked their careers on the success of the 
new, with the core ruling circle growing 
ever narrower, ever more insular and thus 
more brittle. Perhaps the response of Samuel 
Finer, author of The Man on Horseback: the role 
of the military in politics, to his own question 
is apposite: he asks why, given the strength 
of military forces around the world and 
the consequent vulnerability of civilian 
governments, there are not more military 
dictatorships internationally. His answer is 
twofold: ‘one weakness is the armed forces’ 
technical inability to administer any but the 
most primitive community. The second is 
their lack of legitimacy: that is to say, their 
lack of moral title to rule’ (Finer 2002:14). 
In other words, soldiers tend not to be very 
good at politics.
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Note
1 This paper was originally presented at the 
Crawford Fiji Updates in Canberra and 
Brisbane in August 2009
